We examine stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. For the fl-discounted case, as well as for the irreducible limiting average case, we show the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria and give characterizations of those equilibria. In the final section, we give an example which illustrates that the existence of stationary limiting average equilibria in a nonirreducible stochastic game does not imply the existence of a perfect limiting average equilibrium.
Introduction
To keep notations simple, we restrict the analysis to 2-person stochastic games; the results can easily be extended to N-person games with N > 2.
A 2-person stochastic game is a finite set of matrices {M1, M2 .... , Mz} corresponding with the set of states S = {1, 2,..., z}. The matrix Ms has size rn, × ns, and the entry (i,j) of Ms is given as ~ rl (s, i,j), r:(s,~ . JOTA: VOL, 69, NO. 2, MAY 1991 Here, p(s, i,j) = (p(11 s, i,j), p(21s , i, j),..., p(zls , i,j) 
A~={ qER~:q---0' ~,=l qt:l}.
The interpretation is as follows: Play can start in any state of S, and transitions occur at stages n ~N. If play is in state s at stage n, then independently and simultaneously player 1 chooses i ~ {1, 2,..., ms} and player 2 chooses j~ {1, 2,..., ns}. The triplet (s, i,j) determines a direct payoff rk (s, i,j) to player kE {1, 2} as well as a probability vector p(s, i,j), whose meaning is that, at stage n+ 1, play will be in state t c S with probability p (tls, i,j) . In this way, the play proceeds from stage to stage and from state to state.
We allow the players to randomize over their pure actions, which means that, in state s, player 1 [2] uses some mixed action xs ~ Am'[ys ~ An']. Now,
player 1 [2] will choose action i[j] with probability xs(i)[y,(j)].
Each player's interest is to maximize his total income, without making binding agreements. To achieve this goal, each player uses some strategy: this is a plan that, at any stage of play, given the current state as well as the history, tells the player what mixed action to use. The history of play at stage n is the sequence ((sl, il ,j0, (s2, i2,J2), • • •, (sn-l, in-1 ,J,-1)) of past triplets of states and actions that occurred.
A stationary strategy is a strategy for which only the current state decides what mixed action is to be used, and neither stage nor history play a role. Hence, a stationary strategy for player 1 is simply some 
S=I
Each player wants to maximize his own expected total income. In this paper, we deal with two interpretations of expected total income: the /3-discounted reward and the limiting average (or undiscounted) reward. Let R. k be the random variable denoting the direct payoff to player k at stage n, and let Es~. denote expectation with respect to starting in s and players using (o-, ~'). Then, y~ (s, o', ~'):= Es, , , =, ,
